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Abstract
The paper constructs a mixed channel OEM supply chain 
model consisting of brand dealer and manufacturer, with 
brand dealer acting as the main parties of Stackelberg and 
manufacturer as the subordinate. This paper compares 
the profit changes of the supply chain in three situations: 
single brand channel, the mixed dual channel after the 
manufacturer opens the direct channel and dual channels 
where brand dealer penalize manufacturer for direct sales 
channels. The research results prove that the introduction 
of direct sales channels by manufacturer can enhance 
the advantages of the game and gain more profits. Under 
certain conditions, brand dealer would also benefit from 
the introduction of direct sales channels, so as to achieve a 
win-win result. When brand dealers’ profits are infringed, 
brand dealer can reduce the losses caused by direct sales 
channels by punishing direct sales channels. What’s more, 
the better the direct channel acceptance, the better the 
effect of the method. The total profit of the supply chain is 
reduced with the increase of the direct channel acceptance.
Key words: Mixed channel; Brand premium; Price 
and service decision; Punishment means
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INTRODUCTION
With the rapid development of China's economy, a large 
number of international brands have entered the Chinese 
market. Generally speaking, there are two choices for 
brands to enter the new market. Investment construction 
and cooperation with large manufacturers. Because 
China's own processing industry is relatively mature and 
its processing cost is relatively low, most brands choose 
to cooperate with large manufacturers. For example, 
Clothing brands like "Zara" "Mango", sports brands 
like "Adidas" "Nike" did not choose to build their own 
factories in China. In addition, some well-developed 
brands may also retain high-value-added services such 
as design and sale, and outsource their production and 
processing to manufacturers. Manufacturers are in a weak 
position in cooperation with famous brand. In order to 
weaken the strong dominant power of brand owners, 
many manufacturers have opened up their own direct 
sales channels. On the hand, the purpose of manufacturers 
to develop direct marketing channels is to gain more 
consumer surplus and expand business scale. On the other 
hand, they form the relationship between the cooperation 
and competition with the brands, so as to gain more status 
in the supply chain of the game with the brands.
In real life, we observed on Taobao platform that 
merchants sale goods with "tailstock" and "original 
goods". This is a scenario in which manufacturers open 
direct sales channels. After supplying the Brand dealers 
with the agreed quantity of products, the manufacturers 
also sells the surplus products directly at a cheap price. 
It has become a common phenomenon for manufacturers 
to open direct channels in real life. In most cases, the 
leading brands will sign contracts with manufacturers 
and formulate corresponding penalties (in order to 
maintain the market share and profits of brand owners, 
prevent low-price products from direct channels from 
disrupting market order, etc.), For example, the U.S. 
depot inc. canceled cooperation with all manufacturers 
that use direct marketing channels (Jiang, Li, & He, 2016, 
pp.145-151). Of course in certain cases, manufacturers' 
opening up direct sales channels are also beneficial to 
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brand owners. Therefore, the first research content of 
this article lies in the influence of the manufacturers' 
private direct sales channels on the brand under different 
market conditions. The second research focuses on how 
brands take advantage of its dominant position and use 
punishments to curb the impact of manufacturers' direct 
sales channels.
A mixture of brand channels and direct selling 
channels exist between manufacturers and brands. In 
such a competitive partnership, it is possible to gain more 
benefits because of the introduction of new consumer 
groups, and may also lead to channel conflicts, thus 
reducing the efficiency of the supply chain. Therefore, the 
effective coordination of the mixed channel supply chain is 
significant. At present, the research of dual-channel supply 
chain mainly focuses on the problem of dual-channel 
supply chain coordination where manufacturers dominate. 
For example, Dumrongsiri, Fan, Jain and Moinzadeh 
(2008, pp.691-718) found that when manufacturers have 
high distribution costs, small wholesale prices and small 
changes in market demand, it is more advantageous to 
choose dual channel sales than single channels ; Park and 
Keh (2003, pp.155-167) analyzed the pricing game under 
the three forms of direct sales, retail and mixed channels, 
and found that the introduction of direct channels would 
reduce market prices and increase market sales; Tsay and 
Agrawal (2004, pp.93-110) believed that if considering 
the cost of sales from different channels, the increase in 
direct sales channels would not have a negative impact 
on the retail channel. On the contrary, retailers hoped that 
manufacturers can increase direct sales channels. Dan 
Bin, Xu Guangye and Zhang Xumei (2016, pp.125-130) 
constructed the dual-channel supply chain model under 
the e-commerce environment and compared the optimal 
prices of the dual-channel supply chain under centralized 
and decentralized decision-making. Chiang, Chhajed and 
Hess (2003, pp.1-20) used game theory to analyze the 
competition between the manufacturer's online channel 
and the traditional retail channel. They believed that the 
online channel restricts the retailer's pricing behavior, 
but as the wholesale price decreased, the total sales 
would increase, and the benefits of both sides would 
increase. Eventually, the coordination between traditional 
channels and online channels would be realized. Yao and 
Liu's research (2005, pp.235-247) showed that OEM' 
adjustments to wholesale prices can harmonize the conflict 
between traditional channels and e-direct channels; Yan 
and Pei (2009, pp.306-314) studied the balance of prices 
and services after manufacturers opened up direct sales 
channels. Retailers are influenced by fierce competition, 
which would improve their service level, and make the 
whole supply chain have better performance.
At present, there are also some scholars concerned 
about the coordination of the OEM supply chain, which 
is dominated by brand dealers. Fan Xiaojun (2017) 
demonstrated that when the product online fitness is high 
enough, the introduction of online channels by OEM 
supply chain  can motivate retailers to improve service 
quality. The higher the product's online fitness, the more 
obvious the improvement of service quality, Under certain 
conditions, the introduction of online channels can achieve 
win-win results for both brand dealer and manufacturer. 
Jiang Jinde (Jinang, Li, & He, 2016, pp.145-151; Jin, 
Li, & Song, 2014) demonstrated that the price discount 
and income compensation coordination mechanism can 
maximize the total profit of the supply chain and achieve 
a perfect win-win coordination among the members of 
the mixed channel supply chain. The article considered 
changes in the dual-channel utility after the introduction 
of direct sales channels, but did not investigate the costs 
of manufacturers in opening up direct sales channels.
The biggest difference between this study (consider 
the mixed channel OEM supply chain price and service 
competition strategy of the brand dealers' penalties) and 
the existing dual-channel supply chain coordination 
problem is that: In the traditional dual channel problem, 
the manufacturer is in the dominant position, generally 
the main side of the Stackelberg. In the mixed channel of 
brand channel and direct sell channel, the brand dealers 
are in the main side of the Stackelberg because of more 
market position. Therefore, the brand dealers can use 
dominant position to formulate "punishment measures" 
to effectively coordinate the manufacturers to open up 
direct channel problems, thus making the best profit. This 
study is based on the perspective of the dominant brand 
merchants, and studies how to formulate measures under 
the premise of manufacturers' new direct channels. The 
research would enrich and expand existing dual-channel 
supply chain coordination research, and it has strong 
practical significance.
1.  DECISION UNDER THE SINGLE 
BRAND CHANNEL
In this paper, we use the subscript s to express the direct 
sales channel, use the subscript r to express the brand 
channel, and use the subscript sr to express the whole 
supply chain. The subscript 1, 2, and 3 correspond to 
the three situations in this article, the single channel, 
the mixed channel, and the brand merchant to punish 
the direct sales channel. let’s explain the mathematical 
symbols involved in this article: Table 1 will explain the 
mathematical symbols involved in the paper.
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Table 1
The Mathematical Symbols Involved in the Paper
Parameter Meaning
Pri Sales price of brand channel, i=1、2、3represent different situations discussed in this paper;
Psi Sales price of direct sales channel，i=2、3represent different situations discussed in this paper；
Dri market demand of brand channel，i=1、2、3represent different situations discussed in this paper；
Dsi market demand of direct sales channel，i=2、3represent different situations discussed in this pape；
Wri Wholesale price of brand channel，i=1、2、3represent different situations discussed in this paper；
hi Profit level obtained by brand dealers，i=1、2、3represent different situations discussed in this paper；
λ
The consumer acceptance level of direct sell channel, we assume that under the same conditions, consumers’ acceptance of 
direct sell  channel is lower than the acceptance level of brand channel.0< λ <1；
d Brand promotion coefficient of brand channel, Represents a unit brand service effort corresponding to the brand premium situation；
t The promotion level of brand service, Represents the effort of the brand to pay for the brand premium.
Under the single brand, there is only a single 
manufacture and a single brand dealer. The game decision 
is a vertical game between the manufacturer and the 
retailer, and its structure is shown in the following figure 1.
Figure 1
Structure Under the Single Brand Channel
1.1  Requirement Function
In a single channel, consumers only buy in brand 
channels. The value of products is represented by V. 
Due to the heterogeneity of consumers, the evaluation 
of product value would be different, assuming that the 
product value is evenly distributed among [0,1]. By 
offering t brand service, the brand brings dt premium 
to consumers. The utility of the consumer is (Fan, Liu, 
2017): Ur=V-Pr+dt, Therefore, only when the product 
value Vr=Pr-dt > 0, would the consumer buy the product. 
Consumer demand for brand channels is Dr=1-Pr+dt
1.2  Pricing and Service Decision
In the single brand channel, the brand dealer occupies the 
dominant position, the manufacture and the brand dealer 
carry on the sequential Stackelberg, its actual decision 
order is: the brand dealer first decides its profit level h1 
and the brand service level t1, Therefore, the selling price 
of brand channels is Pr1=Wr1+h1. The manufacture decides 
the optimal wholesale price Wr1 under the brand profit 
level h1 and brand service level t1 have been decided, We 
use the inverse order to solve the problem.
T h e  m a n u f a c t u r e ’ s  p r o f i t  e x p r e s s i o n  i s 
πs1=Wr1Dr1=Wr1(1-Pr+dt)
The brand dealer’s profit expression is πr1=(Pr1-Wr1)
Dr1-t
2
1=h1(1-Pr+dt)-t
2,
Decision result is：
The best profit level of the brand is.h1= 
2
8-d2 ;The best 
wholesale price is.Wr1= 
2
8-d2 ;
The optimal price of brand channel is.Pr1= 
6
8-d2 ;The 
best service level of brand dealer is t1= 
d
8-d2
The demand for brand channel is.Dr1= 
2
8-d2 ;The 
biggest profit for the brand dealer is.πr1= 
1
8-d2 ;
The biggest profit for the OEM is πs1= 
4
(8-d2)2
；The 
total profit of the supply chain is.πsr1= 
12-d2
(8-d2)2;
The constraint that must be met is 8-d2 > 0
2.  OEM MIXED DUAL CHANNEL DECISION
The mixed channel refers to brand channels and direct 
sales channels opened up by manufacture. There is a 
vertical game and horizontal game decision between the 
brand dealers and the manufacture, which makes the 
channel chaos easily. Its structure is shown in figure 2 
below.
Figure 2
Structure Under Mixed Channel
2.1  Requirement Function
When manufacture introduce direct sell channels, 
consumers can buy goods from brand channels and 
direct sales channels, use V to express the value of the 
product and assume a uniform distribution between [0, 
1]. Consumers can obtain brand premiums in the brand 
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channel, and the brand channel construction is more 
mature, so the acceptance of brand channels is even 
higher. Assume that the consumer acceptance of the brand 
channel is 1, the acceptance of the direct sales channel 
is λ,(λ<1). For the brand channel, the utility obtained by 
the consumer is: Ur=V-Pr+dt that is, if the value of the 
product is distributed among[Pr-dt,1], the consumer will 
purchase the product from the brand channel. For direct 
sales channels, the utility that consumers get is: Us=λV-Ps 
that is, consumers only purchase the product in the direct 
sales channel when the product value is distributed among 
[
Ps
λ ,1]. When Ur=Us, namely V
*
rv= Pr-Ps-dt1-λ
 , Consumers 
purchase indifference goods from two channels. When 
Vrs<V
*
rs，Ur<US  .The utility of buying from direct sales 
channels is higher at this time, when Vrs > V
*
rs ,Ur > US. The 
utility of buying from brand channels is higher.
When Vs<Vr, we get Vs < Vr < Vsr. Firstly assume Vsr<1, 
namely 0<Vs<Vr<Vsr<1, When the product value among 
[0, Psλ ], consumers will not buy goods from any channel, 
when the product value among [
Ps
λ ,
Pr-Ps-dt
1-λ ],consumers 
will buy from direct sales channel, when the product value 
among[ Pr-Ps-dt1-λ ,1],consumers will choose to purchase 
from the brand channels.
WhenVs < Vv, we get Vs < Vr < Vsr. Secondly assume 
Vsr>1, namely 0<Vs<Vr<1<Vsr, When the product value 
among[0, Psλ ], consumers will not buy goods from any 
channel. when the product value among[ Ps
λ
,1], consumers 
will buy from direct sales channel.
When Vr < Vs, we get 0<Vsr<Vr<Vs<1，When the 
product value among[Pr-dt,1]，consumers will not 
buy goods from any channel, when the product value 
among[Pr-dt,1], consumers will choose to purchase from 
the brand channels.
Table 2
Channel Market Requirements Under Different Defined Domains
Domain The market demand of direct sales channel The market demand of brand channel
0<Vs<Vr<Vsr<1
Pr-Ps-dt
1-λ  - 
Ps
λ 1-
Pr-Ps-dt
1-λ
0<Vs<Vr<1<Vsr 1- 
Ps
λ
0
0<Vsr<Vr<Vs<1 0 1-Pr+dt
The premise of this article is that the manufacture 
opens up direct sales channels and forms a horizontal 
competition with the brand dealer, the cases of the second 
single channel and the third single channel would not 
be considered. This article only considers the case of 
0<Vs<Vr<Vsr<1, namely the market demand of direct sales 
channel is Ds=Vsr-Vs=
Pr-Ps-dt
1-λ -
Ps
λ
, the market demand of 
brand channel is Dr=1-Vsr=1-
Pr-Ps-dt
1-λ .
2.2  Pricing and Service Decisions.
In mixed channels, a sequential Steinberg game is also 
carried out between manufacture and brand dealer. Its 
actual decision order is: the brand dealer first decides its 
profit level h2 and the brand service level t2, Therefore, 
the selling price of brand channels is Pr2=Wr2+h2. The 
manufacture decides the optimal wholesale price Wr1 and 
the selling price of direct sales channel Ps2  under the 
brand profit level h2 and brand service level t2 have been 
decided, we use the inverse order to solve the problem.
T h e  m a n u f a c t u r e ’ s  p r o f i t  e x p r e s s i o n  i s 
πs2=Wr2Dr2+Ps2Ds2=Wr2(1-
Pr-Ps-dt
1-λ )+Ps2(
Pr-Ps-dt
1-λ -
Ps
λ
)
The brand dealer ‘s profit expression is πr2=(Pr2-Wr2)
Dr2-t
2
2=h2(1-
Pr-Ps-dt
1-λ )-t
2
2
Decision result is:
The best profit level of the brand is h2= 
4(1-λ)2
8-8λ-d2 ;
The best service level of brand dealer is t2= 
d-dλ
8-8λ-d2
The best wholesale price is Wr2= +
d2(1-λ)-4(1-λ)2
2(8-8λ-d2) ;
The optimal price of brand channel is Pr2=  
+ d
2(1-λ)-4(1-λ)2
2(8-8λ-d2) ;
The optimal price of direct sales channel is Ps2= 
λ—
2
The demand for brand channel is.Dr2=
4-4λ
2(8-8λ-d2) ;
The demand for direct sales channel is Ds2=
4-4λ-d2
2(8-8λ-d2)
The biggest profit for the brand dealer is πr2=
(1-λ)2
8-8λ-d2 ;
T h e  b i g g e s t  p r o f i t  f o r  t h e  O E M  i s 
πs2=
4(4λ-20λ2-4λd2+12λ3+4λ2d2+4)+λd4
4(8-8λ-d2)2 ;
T h e  t o t a l  s u p p l y  c h a i n  p r o f i t  i s 
πsr2=
4(4λ-20λ2-4λd2+12λ3+4λ2d2+4)+λd4
(8-8λ-d2)2 +
(1-λ)2
8-8λ-d2
The constraint that must be met is.8-8λ-d2>0
2.3  Results Analysis
Comparing the equilibrium results of single-channel and 
mixed-channel decisions, the following propositions can 
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be obtained:
Theorem 1: Manufacture can develop direct sales 
channel to raise their profit level. What’s more, the higher 
the acceptance of direct sales channel, the more obvious 
the profits of manufacture will be raised.
The reasonable explanation of this theorem is that：In 
a single brand channel, manufacture is in a weak position. 
By developing direct sales channel, manufacture can gain 
more status in the competition Moreover, the higher the 
acceptance of direct sales channel λ, the better the effect 
of opening up direct sales channels. Figure 3 shows the 
change of manufacture’s profit with the acceptance of 
direct sales channel λ when the brand premium coefficient 
d=1 is assumed to be brand channel.
Figure 3
Changes In Manufacture’s Profit With Acceptance of 
Direct Selling Channel
Theorem 2: It can be seen from t2-t1=
d-dλ
8-8λ-d2 -
d
8-d2
= d
3λ
(8-d2)(8-8λ-d2) >0, manufacture’s introduction of direct 
sales channels can stimulate brand dealer to improve 
their service quality. And from the πr2-πr1=
(1-λ)2
8-8λ-d2
- 18-d2 =
-8λ+8λ2+2d2-d2λ2
(8-d2)(8-8λ-d2) , It can be seen that when the 
condition of λ > 8-2d
2
8-d2
 is met, the introduction of direct 
sales channels by manufacture is not only beneficial to 
manufacture, but also beneficial to brand retailers. The 
following figure shows the change of brand dealer profit 
with the acceptance degree λ of the direct sales channel 
when the brand premium factor of the brand channel 
is assumed to be d=
3
2 . It can be seen that when λ > 
8-2d2
8-d2
 the profit of the brand dealer in the hybrid channel 
exceeded the profit of the single channel. Figure 4 below 
shows the change of brand profit with the acceptance of 
direct sales channel λ when d=3/2 is assumed.
Figure 4
Changes of Brand Profit With the Acceptance of Direct 
Sales Channel
The rational interpretation of this theorem is that 
there is not only price competition between manufacture 
and brand dealer but also service competition. When the 
acceptance of direct sales channels is relatively high, 
brand dealer can only increase the service level of their 
brand channels in order to attract consumers. Under the 
condition of λ > 
8-2d2
8-d2
,It is possible for the brand operators 
to attract new consumers from the direct selling channel 
by improving the channel service level, thereby improving 
their overall profit level. Therefore, in real life, some 
brands strictly prohibit manufacture from opening up 
direct sales channels by signing contracts or threatening to 
replace manufacture. However, some brands have adopted 
a “turn a blind eye” attitude toward manufacture opening 
up direct sales channels.
3.  DUAL CHANNELS WHERE BRAND 
DEALER PENALIZE MANUFACTURE 
FOR DIRECT SALES CHANNELS
Brand merchants use their dominant position to set up a 
penalty for each unit of direct selling product, which is 
shown in figure 5 below. Its market demand function is 
the same as before.
Figure 5
The Structure of Dual Channels Where Brand Dealer 
Penalize Manufacture for Direct Sales Channels
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3.1  Pricing and Service Decisions
In a dual channel where brand dealer penalize manufacture 
for direct sales channel, there is still a sequential Steinberg 
game between manufacture and brand dealer, and the 
decision sequence is the same as before. Brand dealer 
punish manufacturers for their own direct sales channels, 
and each unit direct product is fined CS.
The OEM’s profit expression is πs3=Wr3Dr3+Ps3Ds3-
Ds3Cs=Wr2(1-
Pr-Ps-dt
1-λ
)+(Ps3-Cs)(
Pr-Ps-dt
1-λ
-
Ps
λ
)
The brand dealer’s profit expression is πs3=(Pr3-Wr3)
Dr3-t
2
3+Ds3Cs=h3(1-
Pr-Ps-dt
1-λ
)-t23+Cs(
Pr-Ps-dt
1-λ
-
Ps
λ
)
Decision result is:
The best profit level of the brand is.h3=Cs+
4(1-λ2)
8-8λ-d2
;
The best service level of brand dealer is t3=
d-dλ
8-8λ-d2
The best wholesale price is Wr3=
1
2 -
Cs
2 +
d2(1-λ)-4(1-λ)2
2(8-8λ-d2)
;
The optimal price of brand channel is.Pr3=
1
2 +
Cs
2
d2(1-λ)+4(1-λ)2
2(8-8λ-d2)
;
The optimal price of direct sales channel is Ps3=
λ
2 +
Cs
2
The demand for brand channel is.Dr3=
4-4λ2
2(8-8λ-d2)；
The demand for direct sales channel is Dr3=
4-4λ2-d2
2(8-8λ-d2)
- Cs2λ
The biggest profit for the brand dealer is πs3=
λCs-C
2
s
2λ
+
(1-λ)2
8-8λ-d2
;
The biggest profit for the OEM is 
πs3=
-4λ2-d2λ-8Cs+8λCs+d
2Cs+4
4(8-8λ-d2)
-
Cs(λ-Cs)
4λ
+
(1-λ)2(d2-4+4λ)
(8-8λ-d2)2
;；
The total supply chain profit is πsr2=
λCs-C
2
s
2λ
+
(1-λ)2
8-8λ-d2
+
-4λ2-d2λ-8Cs+8λCs+d
2Cs+4
4(8-8λ-d2)
-
Cs(λ-Cs)
4λ
+
(1-λ)2(d2-4+4λ)
(8-8λ-d2)2
The constraint that must be met is.8-8λ-d2>0
At the same time, in order to guarantee Cs < Ps3 and 
Ds3>0, we must meet Cs<λ and 4λ-4λ
2-λd2-8Cs+8λCs+d
2Cs 
≥ 0
3.2  Results Analysis
The following theorems are obtained by comparing the 
equilibrium results of the first single channel, second 
mixed channels and third kinds of brand dealers to 
punish the manufacturers by opening direct channels for 
punishment.
Theorem 1: comparing with OEM mixed dual 
channel  and Dual  channels  where brand dealer 
penalize manufacture for direct sales channels :，
Due to the restriction of λ>Cs we can see that after 
the implementation of the punishment measures, the 
manufacture’s profit water is limited. Under other 
conditions, the manufacture’s profit level increases 
with the increase in the direct sales channel acceptance 
λ.in order to mitigate the impact of brand punishment, 
manufacture would increase the sales price of their direct 
sales channels, so the market demand of direct selling 
channels would be reduced. The manufacture’s profit 
change is shown in figure 6 below.
Figure 6
Changes in Manufacture’s Profit With Acceptance of 
Direct Selling Channel
Theorem 2: comparing with OEM mixed dual 
channel and Dual channels where brand dealer penalize 
manufacture for direct sales channels.Δπr=πr3-πr2=
λCs-C
2
s
2λ
+
(1-λ)2
8-8λ-d2
-
(1-λ)2
8-8λ-d2
=
Cs(λ-Cs)
2λ
，Due to the restriction of λ 
> Cs we can see that after the implementation of the 
punishment measures, the profit level of the brand dealers 
has increased significantly. The brand dealers can use 
penalty measures to “recover” some of the profits lost by 
the manufacture to open up direct sales channels. Under 
the condition of other fixed conditions, the profit level 
of the brand merchant increases with the increase of 
the direct sales channel acceptance λ.When4λ-4λ2-λd2-
8Cs+8λCs+d
2Cs=0,namely Ds3=
4-4λ-d2
2(8-8λ-d2)
-
Cs
2λ
=0,Branding 
companies can completely suppress manufacture’ 
behavior of opening up direct sales channels through the 
establishment of penalties, so that the profits of brand 
dealer can reach the profit level of a single channel. Figure 
7 below shows the change in the profitability of the brand 
with the direct sales channel λ.
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Figure 7
Changes of Brand Profit With the Acceptance of Direct 
Sales Channel
Theorem 3: Compared to the second case of mixed 
channels, the total profit level of the supply chain in the 
third scenario is reduced. Δπsr=Δπr+Δπs=
Cs(λ-Cs)
2λ
+
Cs(2λ-Cs)
4λ =
Cs(λ-Cs)
2λ +
Cs(2λ-Cs)
4λ =
Cs(4λ-3Cs)
4λ
 D u e  t o  t h e 
restriction of λ>Cs, it can be seen that the total profit of 
the supply chain decreases after the implementation of the 
penalty measures. Under other fixed conditions, the total 
profit of the supply chain decreases with the increase of 
the direct sales channel acceptance λ and increases with 
the increase of the unit punishment cost Cs. Figure 8 below 
shows the total profit of the supply chain as a function of 
the degree of acceptance of the direct sales channel 
Reasonable explanation: branding penalties for direct 
sales channels will inhibit the development of direct 
sales channels and can not improve the service level of 
brand channels. In general, profits are only redistributed 
among brands and manufacturers. Moreover, punishment 
measures inhibit the development of direct sales channels 
and reduce the total supply chain level.
Figure 8
Total Profit of Supply Chain Changes With the 
Acceptance of Direct Sales Channels
CONCLUSION
This paper studies the channel confusion caused by the 
manufacture opening direct sales channel and compares 
the profit changes of the supply chain in three situations: 
single brand channel, the mixed dual channel after the 
manufacturer opens the direct channel and dual channels 
where brand dealer penalize manufacture for direct sales 
channels of the mixed dual channel. The results of the 
study verified that manufacturers’ opening up of direct 
sales channels would significantly increase their revenues. 
Under certain conditions, both sides of the game would 
achieve a win-win result. Fierce channels can help brand 
channels improve service quality, reduce sales prices, 
attract more consumers and thus increase profits. At the 
same time, based on the perspective of brand owners, this 
research demonstrates that brands’ use of their dominant 
position to punish fixed units of direct sales channels can 
effectively inhibit manufacturers from opening up direct 
sales channels. However, this type of restriction would 
bring about a drop in the total profit of the supply chain.
The main difference between this study and the former 
is that in the coordination of the supply chain of the OEM 
production chain, the brand dealers are in the main side of 
the Stackelberg, It is the first time to study the feasibility 
of brand dealers to punish direct sales channels from the 
perspective of branding, which is further enriching and 
expanding the research on dual channel supply chain.
This gives us some management inspiration: When 
the channel acceptance rate of direct selling channels 
is relatively high, opening up direct selling channels 
is not only beneficial to manufacturers, but also good 
for brand dealers. Therefore, generally speaking, large 
manufactures have more conditions to build mature direct 
sales channels, so brand owners are more likely to accept 
large manufacturers to open up direct sales channels, and 
strictly prohibit small workshops to open up direct sales 
channels. And when the profit of the brand business is 
infringed, the way to punish the direct channel can be 
taken, the better the channel acceptance is, the better the 
effect of the method. At the same time, the total profit of 
the supply chain would be less obvious with the increase 
of the direct channel acceptance.
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